Arab American Political Participation by Stockton, Ronald R. & Stockton, Ronald R.
 1 
 
 
 
 
Boringly Normal 
 
Patterns of  Arab American Participation  
 
 
 
 
 
Ronald R. Stockton 
 
University of Michigan-Dearborn 
4901 Evergreen Road 
Dearborn, Michigan 48126 
 
Rstock@umich.edu 
313-593-5384 
 
 
 
Conference on the Political Participation of Arab Americans 
 
Wilson International Center for Scholars  
Washington, D. C. 
 
May 5, 2006 
 
 
 
This is a Working Draft 
Comments are Welcome 
 
A shortened, revised version of this with full citations was published in American Arabs 
and Political Participation (edited by Philippa Strum), Wilson International Center for 
Scholars, 2006.  
 
\ 
 2 
Patterns of Arab American Participation  
 
Ronald R. Stockton 
 
 
Describing Arab American political participation is not as easy as it might seem. 
Participation has so many  dimensions and levels  that the very definition of the term  
becomes an issue.  Do we mean voting or demonstrating or running for office or joining a 
group or having a “support your local police” bumper sticker?  And how do different 
types of participation—political and non-political, national and local--relate to each 
other?   And what do we do with the fact that the Arab American community does not 
function as a cohesive entity but is highly differentiated internally by religion, nationality, 
class, immigration cohort, and reason for arrival?1  How do we even generalize?  
 Consider, for example, the expected  participation patterns of two Arab American 
communities that are quite different from each other.  The first is  primarily an immigrant 
community with  78% of its adult population born overseas.  Few speak English in the 
home (86% use Arabic or Chaldean),  most (63%) get their television news from overseas 
via satellite dishes that bring Al Jazeera and other Arab stations into their homes; and a 
full half  think an Arab or Muslim accused of terrorism could not receive a fair trial in the 
U. S.  Would  such a community even participate in American politics?  
                                                 
1According to the 2000 census, 37% of those nationally of Arab heritage are Lebanese, 12% Syrian, 12% 
Egyptian, 6% Palestinian, 3% Jordanian, 3% Moroccan, 3% Iraqi.  In Michigan,  the pattern is  Lebanese 
36%, Iraqi 30% (25% being Christian), 3% Palestinian, 6% Syrian, Egyptian and Jordanian 2% each.  16% 
identify with a general term such as ‘Arab” and others decline to classify themselves.  Samhan (October, 
2003) reports that the socioeconomic make-up of the national community as follows (with comparison for 
the full census): Has BA 40% (US 25%), professional or management 42% (US 34%), retail trade 31% (US 
15%), service 12% (US 27%), income of $75,000 or up 30% (US 22%). In Michigan, the US census (2003)  
found 115,000 persons of Arab or Chaldean ancestry, 80% of whom live in the three county area.  Many  
observers believe this is an undercount.   The Arab American Institute (2003) cites a figure of 450,000 a  
figure  not supported by statewide polling data. Regarding religion, the DAAS found that 58% of the 
sample was Christian. If this were projected to the whole state it would produce a figure of 54,000 persons 
who are both Muslim and Arab. The problem of estimating is compounded by the fact that Muslim leaders 
(who may not have formal membership lists) can offer high estimates of the total persons affiliated with 
their congregations.  (Since many Muslims attend more than one congregation, such overestimates do not 
imply fabrication).  There are also political advocacy groups that grab onto the highest estimate and taut it 
as the “true” figure.  Regarding various estimates, Bagby et al (2001)  came up with a figure of six to seven  
million Muslims in the country.  This was widely criticized on methodological grounds.  The Yearbook of 
American and Canadian Churches (2000) estimates that there are 3.9 million Muslims.  It is not clear 
where they get this figure.  Smith  (2002) analyzed several efforts to estimate the Muslim population.  His 
is the most reliable discussion of the estimates and the methodological issues involved in estimation.  He 
concluded that there are 1.9-2.8 million Muslims in the country, perhaps 1 percent of the total population.  
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Now consider a second community.  In this community, 91% say they are proud 
to be an American, 86% say they feel at home in America, 86% say America is a land of 
equal opportunity, and  86% say they have confidence in the local police.  For this 
community, their  lives are such that only a handful (7%) are at high risk for anxiety or 
depression (actually below the risk level of the general population).  Will they not be at 
the front of every parade?   
Of course, the question is a trick.  These are not two communities but are one, 
reflecting data from the Detroit Arab American Study of 2003, the study from which 
much of this paper will be drawn. 2  If responses to these questions seem to defy simple 
answers, then, indeed,  they defy simple answers.  The Arab American  communities of 
metropolitan Detroit contain within themselves a complex mosaic of patterns that do not 
lend themselves to simple generalizations.   There are Christians and Muslims and sub-
groups of each.  There are Lebanese, Iraqis, Yemenis, Syrians, Palestinians, Jordanians, 
and Egyptians. There are those whose ancestors have been in America for a century, and 
others who are still learning the language.  There are educated professionals, business 
owners, union workers, service workers, and welfare recipients.  Many of these sub-
groups live in different places, move in different circles, marry along different lines, and 
vote differently.  It is very difficult for leaders to create cohesive political behavior,  or 
for social scientists to identify cohesive political positions.   
The Detroit Arab American Study was conducted just after the President 
delivered his “Mission Accomplished” speech.  The Iraqi resistance had not gotten 
organized and many in the Iraqi community enthusiastically supported the war.  It was 
two years after the attacks of September 11.  The USA PATRIOT Act had been passed 
and FBI interviews (with recent arrivals) caused grave apprehension in the community 
about issues of civil liberties.  Many individuals thought they were under surveillance.  In 
the 2000 election,  various local community bodies had  encouraged Arabs to register and 
vote and to participate in the political system.  Many had done so.  Governor George W. 
                                                 
2 The Detroit Arab American Study is a comprehensive, in-depth quantitative study.  It consists of 1016 
hour-long  interviews by trained, bilingual interviewers with a scientific sample of Arab Americans and 
Chaldeans drawn from the tri-county Detroit area.  There were seven members of the research team:  
Wayne Baker, Sally Howell, Amaney Jamal, Ann Lin, Andrew Shryock, Ronald Stockton, Mark Tessler.  
Major funding was by the Russell Sage Foundation with supplementary funding by the Carnegie 
Foundation.    
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Bush had criticized the  ethnic profiling of Arab-Americans and had won the support of 
many in  the community but then had come to be seen as “profiler- in-chief.”   
 
Three Patterns of Participation 
Perhaps we can think of three distinctive types of political participation,  
Prominent Citizens, Politically Influential Organizations, and Individual Participation.  
By Prominent Citizens we mean those who hold positions of influence or trust in the 
public sector, be they elected, appointed or civil service.  In this dimension Arab 
Americans in southeast Michigan excel.  Far from being a marginalized community  
excluded from the political system,  many Arabs hold  prominent positions.  There are at 
least two Arab-American mayors, several members of city  or county councils, members 
of Boards of Education, judges, and members of the state legislature.  The following 
summary by  Howell and Jamal (2005) makes the point:   
Arab Detroiters are uniquely situated in positions of local power and influence.  
The City of Detroit, for example, is a border town, home to the Ambassador 
Bridge and the Detroit-Windsor Tunnel which carry between them nearly a third 
of all traffic crossing the US/Canada border.  The Ambassador Bridge is rare 
among American border crossings in that it is privately owned and operated.  It is 
rarer still for being owned by an immigrant form Lebanon, Manuel Maroun.  
Likewise, when international travelers arrive at the Detroit Metropolitan Airport, 
they pass through a terminal bearing the name of another Lebanese American, 
former Wayne County Road Commissioner Michael (aka Mohammed) Berry.  
Flight schedules and ground traffic at the airport are managed by Hassan Makled, 
Director of Airfield Operations, who, like Berry, is an active member of the 
Islamic Center of America [Note: A large mosque].  All this coming and going is 
carefully monitored by Detroit and Wayne County Homeland Security Task 
Forces, both of which are led, in part, by Lebanese American law enforcement 
officers who are also Shi’a Muslims.  These men are among more than 60 
deputized Arab Americans in Wayne County alone, where Azzam Elder, a 
Palestinian American, was recently named Deputy Wayne County Executive.  
Elder is one of at least 34 Arab Americans in Michigan to hold a political 
appointment, while the state is home to at least 21 Arab American elected 
officials.  This list, with its perhaps surprising inclusion of Arab Americans who 
work for Homeland Security Task Forces, is perfectly mundane in Detroit.  It 
does not include the much larger number of Arab Americans who sit on the 
boards of local hospitals and the United Way, serve as Regents of state 
universities, or are active participants in the local ACLU, UAW, Civil Rights 
Board, or many of the State’s important non-profit organizations.  While no other 
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state can rival Michigan’s high number of Arab public servants, similar patterns 
of community service by Arab Americans can be found across the U.S.3  
 
The second dimension of participation is at the organizational level.  When Arabs 
began coming to this country over a century ago, their first organizations were local and 
communal.  They formed churches and mosques and village associations.  Suleiman 
(1993) noted that in those early decades, Arabs thought of themselves as temporary 
residents.  Their  approach was “to go about one’s business of making money with as 
little interaction as possible” with non-Arabs (p. 41). During this time, “their involvement 
in U.S. society, other than in the workplace, was consciously and deliberately minimal, if 
not practically nonexistent” (p 38). But especially after World War I,  an “assimilationist 
approach began to gain favor and became the dominant orientation” (p. 41). Arabs 
“became truly an Arab-American community, i.e., they realized that, much as many of 
them desired to go back, there was no ‘going home again’” (P. 43). There was a ‘strong 
identification with the United States” and a “tentative but tangible process of U. S. 
politicization” including voting, party membership, and “some public or political service 
on the local and state levels” (P. 44).  There were  calls for the various sub-communities 
to begin a process of unification to maximize their influence (p. 43). 
After 1967, the community saw a new surge of organizations, driven by a sense of 
danger in the Arab world. (See Terry, 1999 or Haddad, et al, 2006). Five organizations 
stand out.  Arab American University Graduates was founded in 1968 as an association 
of  politicized intellectuals who held conferences, debated issues, and published books. In 
1973 the National Association of Arab Americans was formed as a political body.  They  
lobbied for legislation and tried to influence policy.  The ABSCAM Scandal of 1978 (a 
sting operation in which an FBI agent posing as a corrupt “Arab” tried to bribe a Senator) 
sparked a third organization, the Anti-Discrimination Committee (ADC), under the 
                                                 
3At the national level, there has also been a surge of prominent Arab Americans.     Since 
the 1970s, there have been five Arab American Senators (Abourezk and Abdnor of South 
Dakota, Abraham of Michigan, Mitchell of Maine and Sununu of New Hampshire).   
There have been  several Arab members of the House of Representatives, at least three 
cabinet ministers, and a host of  mayors, council members, and governors, not to mention 
the US commander in Iraq.  All of the Senators are of Lebanese Christian heritage except 
Sununu whose Christian family has its roots in Jerusalem.     
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founding leadership of former Senator James Abourezk.  ADC is committed to promoting 
civil rights and fighting stereotyping.  In 1985 James Zogby formed the Arab American 
Institute to promote Arab participation in politics.  Finally, CAIR (The Council on 
American Islamic Relations) tried to define a mainstream, American-compatible Islam 
with which many in the Arab community would agree.   
 At the local level, in the three-county area of Southeast Michigan, there are a host 
of organizations, and what every politician knows is that it is organization that  drives the 
political process.  Individuals vote but organizations raise money, organize rallies, 
mobilize voters, and bless candidates.   There are mosques and churches, national and 
town clubs (Lebanon Club, Syria Club, Jordan Club, Ramallah Club, and Yemeni 
Benevolent Association, to name a few).  There are  influential community-wide 
organizations including ADC, the Arab-American Chamber of Commerce, ACCESS 
(Arab Community Council for Economic and Social Services), the Arab American and 
Chaldean Council, and the Chaldean Federation.  These have major corporate, 
government, and political linkages.  Some  sub-contract with the government to run 
social service programs, job training, youth programs, English-as-a-second- language 
programs, health care, and even torture recovery counseling.  They have large budgets 
and provide jobs for many individuals in the community.  By linking together ethnic 
organization, government money, corporate sponsorship, and political promotion, they 
are powerful players.  Their annual dinners draw top political leaders including governors 
and senators.  Even though the Detroit Arab American community is not as large as that 
in Los Angeles, it is justifiably more prominent because of its  concentration and  
organizational sophistication.  
As voters, Arab Americans have traditionally leaned to the Democratic side.  The 
appeal of that party for minorities, its civil rights tradition, and the Oslo Accords all 
played a role in making the Democrats seem more sympathetic.  In 2000, the community 
made a shift and gave a plurality of its votes to George W. Bush (Bush 46%, Gore 38%, 
and Lebanese American Ralph Nader 13% according to the Zogby Poll (Arab-AAI.org).   
In the 2000 Presidential debate, when Governor Bush was asked about racial profiling, he 
said “Arab-Americans are racially profiled on what’s called secret evidence.  People are 
stopped.  And we got to do something about that.”  Imad Hamed, prominent head of the 
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Michigan ADC, expressed the sentiments of many when he noted that, “Most of us, 
without hesitation, made it loud and clear and urged the community, basically to vote for 
President Bush. We truly believed that he was representing something new.  We thought 
that his administration would be the administration to make the much-needed change at 
the international level as well as the domestic level.” Those few words by Governor Bush 
shifted thousands of votes into Bush’s camp and made Michigan competitive.  One 
wonders how the outcome of the 2000 election would have been affected if Gore had 
spent that last Sunday evening campaigning in Florida instead of in Dearborn.  
           The political environment for Arab American participation is sometimes 
unfriendly.  There are probably three reasons for this.  First, people with unusual names 
are handicapped.  If your name is Djemal Zeitoun you have a harder job of winning over 
the voters than if your name is James Oliver.  Second, the political environment is 
resistant, especially for Muslims.  There is a constant barrage of anti-Islamic and anti-
Arab statements and writings from pundits, religious leaders, and ideologues.  These have 
had an impact.  A 2003 poll by the Pew Research Center (Keeter and Khout, 2003) 
showed that 44% of Americans think Islam is more likely to encourage violence than 
other religions, up from 25% in 2002.  Disturbingly, this pattern holds when education is 
controlled.  Moreover, 38% say they would be reluctant to vote for a qualified Muslim 
for office.  Finally, many Muslims and Arabs face active resistance to their involvement.  
There have been several cases of persons appointed to advisory committees or staff 
positions having their appointments challenged on the grounds that they made anti-Israeli 
statement or associate with people with such views.  Often the threshold for “anti- Israeli” 
is very low.  Some candidates have even returned donations.  This has happened both to 
Christians and Muslims.  As Haddad observes, “given the importance of donations in 
providing access to elected officials and determining American policies,” returning a 
campaign contribution constitutes “a form of disenfranchisement” (2006:23).  
    
Research on Participation  
 
The way social scientists study public opinion is to begin with what we know 
about those people not in the study.  The traditional American view of political 
participation tended to follow  DeTocqueville (1969) who suggested that when a person 
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got involved in an organizational process, that person learned skills and confidence and 
was then able to participate in a variety of organizations.4  More recent research found a  
different pattern. Now it appears that different types of participation  may operate quite 
independent of each other.  For example, participation in national political processes such 
as voting would be different from participation in localized organizations such as Parent 
Teacher Associations, religious congregations, or social clubs.  And of course there are 
class-based associations such as unions or the Chamber of Commerce.  
When we think of an immigrant community, the primary organization that comes 
to mind is the congregation.  Often the church or mosque is the first organizational 
structure formed and often it is drawn from a village or sub-national base.5  If past 
patterns hold, the congregation quickly becomes multifunctional, serving both as a 
worship center and as a center of community activities.  It may well be that for an 
immigrant community, even into the second or third generation, there will be a multi-
functional pattern of participation that is different from patterns in the general population.   
                                                 
4 DeTocqueville writes in Part II, chapter five of political associations (parties) and 
“those associations in civil life which have no political object”  (p. 513-517).  He believes 
that in a democracy individual citizens are “independent and weak” and would “find 
themselves helpless if they did not learn to help each other voluntarily.”  In isolation 
people “fall back into barbarism” but associated together “feelings and ideas are renewed, 
the heart enlarged, and the understanding developed only by the reciprocal action of men 
one upon another.” DeTocqueville feels strongly about this point: “Among laws 
controlling human societies there is one more precise and clearer, it seems to me, than all 
the others.  If men are to remain civilized or to become civilized, the art of association 
must develop and improve among them at the same speed as equality of conditions 
spreads.”  In chapter seven (pp. 520-524) he addresses the linkages between political and 
civil associations, suggesting that “there must be some natural, perhaps inevitable 
connection between the two types of association.”  The linkage is that “civil associations 
pave the way for political ones” just as political involvement “spreads a general habit and 
taste for association.”  Political involvement “draws a lot of people at the same time out 
of their own circle; however much differences in age, intelligence, or wealth may 
naturally keep them apart, it brings them together and puts them in contact.  Once they 
have met, they always know how to meet again.”  Participation has a universal impact 
since “the technique of association becomes the mother of every other technique.”  
Individuals are empowered since “they learn to submit their own will to that of all the rest 
and to make their own exertions subordinate to the common action, all things which are 
as necessary to know, whether the association be political or civil.”   
5 Boosahda (2003) found that the early Lebanese arrivals in Worcester, Massachusetts were all from a 
single village in the mountains. Their first institution was a church, founded in 1885.   
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Recent research has discovered certain patterns which we can use to contextualize 
and compare Arab American behavior.6   Three patterns stand out.  First, participation 
tends to be much higher among the more established  elements of society.  People act to 
promote and protect their interests, and those with more resources are more likely to be 
active. As Miller (2004, 189-190) puts it, “both organizational and political activity are 
biased toward individuals of privilege.  The wealthy and well educated are more likely to 
both join organizations and participate in politics… Organizational joiners tend to be 
male, white, older, married, own their own homes, earn higher incomes, and boast higher 
levels of education.  On nearly every dimension of status, joiners demonstrate privilege.”  
The impact of education is particularly significant:  “The magnitude of bias against those 
with little formal schooling is especially pronounced” (p. 201).   
Second,  not all participation is the same.  Participation in national politics  
(parties, voting) is different from participation in local or community activities.  “Income, 
education and age figure prominently in predicting nationally-focused participation, 
while their effects are insignificant when it comes to locally–focused 
participation…[Y]ears of residence in the community, marital status and home ownership 
all prove significant in predicting local participation, but not national…At the national 
level, resources matter. At the local level, social ties matter” (p. 150).  The common 
practice of asking about a whole range of activities and then adding them together into a 
cumulative index, as if each was equal to the others, may not work.   
Third,  participation can be issue specific or group specific.  Clusters of 
individuals can be highly mobilized around one issue but not around others. Abortion is 
an example. Many married women with children were stunned in the 1970s to see a 
policy so inconsistent with their fundamental values, and acted politically in this one 
area, but not necessarily others.   Relevant to this phenomenon of selective participation, 
there is evidence that mobilization can spread within ethnic or communal groups.  Miller 
summarizes the pattern: “among a single group of activists, the factors that predict 
campaign activity may resist generalization”  (p. 164).   
 
This analysis will center upon four key questions:   
 
                                                 
6Melissa Miller (2004) has made a thorough review of the literature.  This summary relies upon her work.    
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I.  What is the pattern of participation in the Arab American community, especially 
compared with the general population? 
 
II. How do different types  of participation link to each other?  
 
III.  What impact does religious participation have on other types of participation?  
 
IV. How are male and female patterns similar or different, and why?  
 
 
I.  What is the Participation Pattern? 
 
When compared with the general population,  Arab Americans exhibit a  
participation deficit.  Since information is linked to participation, weaknesses in this areas 
are particularly significant. Table 1 shows that in terms of media consumption, Arab 
Americans are noticeably less likely to watch television news or read a newspaper. They 
are less likely to know the name of the Attorney General (Ashcroft)  or the majority party 
in Congress at the time  (Republicans). While equally likely to follow the Iraq war (where 
some of them would have national and family ties), they are noticeably less likely to 
follow the war on terror.  
Table 1.  Political  Involvement  
 DAS DAAS Male Female Significance (M/F) 
Watch TV news daily  82 58 59 57 Not Significant 
Watch Arab news in week - 58 58 58 Not Significant 
Read newspaper daily 
   Never 
 
29 
17 
43 
26 
35 
10 
49 
 
.000 
Arabic radio news daily - 30 38 23 .000  
Read Arabic Newspaper - 30 28 29 Not Significant 
Use Internet  92 93 91 Not significant 
Internet news daily  
  Never                                   
 
 
29 
28 
34 
21 
23 
36 
 
.001 
Knows Attorney Gen.  
Knows Majority Party  
46* 
76* 
35 
52 
50 
61 
23 
45 
.000 
.000 
Follow War on Terror 
  Very closely, close 
   Little, not much 
 
77* 
23 
 
62 
37 
 
66 
32 
 
58 
41 
 
 
Not Significant (.06) 
Follow Iraq War 
Very closely, close 
 
70* 
 
68 
 
71 
 
65 
 
.04 
Party Identification 
   Democrat 
   Republican 
   Independent 
   No preference  
 
41 
21 
23 
13 
 
25 
20 
33 
21 
 
23 
22 
36 
18 
 
27 
18 
31 
24 
 
 
 
 
.03 
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Ideology 
   Conservative 
   Middle of Road 
   Liberal 
 
34 
47 
17 
 
44 
40 
16 
 
42 
41 
17 
 
46 
39 
15 
 
 
 
Not significant  
Voted 2000 (citizens)  
Registered now (citizens) 
Signed petition past year 
Contributed pol. money 
Contacted official 
70* 
85 
xx 
xx 
xx 
55 
64 
xx 
xx 
xx 
59 
63 
52 
65 
.03 
Not significant  
Attend religious services 
   Weekly 
   Few times p. a.  
   Less than that  
Active in  
   Sports organization 
   Art, Museum, Culture 
   PTA or PTO 
   Professional, business 
   Village, town club 
   Ethnic or advocacy 
   Religious group 
   Union member 
 
24* 
25 
28 
 
26 
15 
18 
25 
- 
- 
39 
14 
 
21 
25 
23 
 
21 
15 
14 
20 
 9 
10 
34 
 5 
 
22 
24 
25 
 
24 
14 
11 
27 
10 
12 
33 
 7 
 
19 
25 
21 
 
18 
15 
17 
14 
 7 
 8 
35 
 3 
 
 
 
Not significant 
 
Not significant 
Not significant 
.04 
.000 
Not significant 
Not significant 
Not significant 
.05 
*DAS Gender difference significant.   
 
In terms of the political system, it is not surprising that their levels are below that 
of the general population,  given the large proportion who are immigrants.  It is  common 
for immigrants to focus upon family, religion, and work,  and to stay away from the 
public sphere.  They often do not understand the issues, the means of political expression, 
or the proper procedures for action.  The data show exactly this pattern.  Arab Americans 
(citizens only)  are  less likely to be registered to vote (65% to 85%), less likely to have 
voted in the 2000 election (55% to 70%).  They are also less likely to identify with a 
political party.  (Twenty-one percent say they have no party preference at all, not even 
“independent.”  Only  13% of the general population gave this answer).  In political 
activity itself (rather than just identification), there is a particular deficit.   Arabs are less 
likely to have signed a petition, contributed money, or contacted an official.   
Organizationally, one might expect that an ethnic community would be focused 
upon community organizations and less upon public affairs.  The ethnic organization is 
the place where people know you and your culture and where you feel at home.   The 
public arena can be more bewildering and less familiar than the “small community.”  In 
particular, the religious organization might well be the focus of one’s life and  identity.  
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In fact, there is some truth in this expectation, but also some surprises.  In some areas of 
organizational activity, Arab Americans are above the general population.  They are more 
likely to have attended a club meeting, have volunteered in some capacity, and to have 
attended a protest or demonstration in the past year.7  There is no difference between the 
two populations in other areas, for example attending a public meeting or being involved 
in some art or cultural organization.  They are less likely to be involved in PTA, a 
business or professional organization, a sports organization or a union. 
These macro patterns, however, raise as many questions as they answer.  The 
more interesting question is not just what but why.   We have to ask what is driving or 
inhibiting participation and how these various participation patterns relate to each other. 
 
II. How do different types of participation link to each other? 
 
If we look at Table 2, we see how the various participation patterns are related.  
First, there is a definite ‘political’ pattern.  Voting is highly related to signing petitions, 
sending money to political causes, and writing or contacting public officials. These 
activities also seem to be driving or at least correlating with a variety of other activities  
not overtly political in the same way.  Those who vote are also involved in the PTA, 
village or town associations, and ethnic groups.  It is not clear what is driving what  but 
the relationship are strong.  (For example, is being involved in your town association 
something that makes you decide to vote, or the other way around?).   
 
Table 2.  Relationships Between Types of Participation* 
 Vote Meet Club Sport Art Union PTA Bus Villag Ethn. Petit Mon. Write 
Vote X   .227 .193 .133 .220 .278 .178 .184 .454 .227 .290 
Meeting  X .614         .078  
Club   X      .110 .077 .064   
Sport    X .539 .433 .466 .507 .444 .427 .277 .193 .179 
Art     X .488 .465 .535 .531 .535 .257 .192 .270 
Union      X .528 .476 .517 .510 .317 .298 .246 
PTA       X .524 .577 .515 .148 .163 .100 
Busin.        X .533 .538 .317 .298 .246 
Village         X .618 .165 .153 .127 
Ethnic          X .210 .202 .214 
Petitit.           X .390 .431 
                                                 
7 Note that in some  areas participation rates are very low overall.  Differences should not be over read.  
Religious participation will be treated in the next section.  
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Money            X .327 
Write             X 
*All figures shown are significant at least in the .05 range.  Those that are bolded are significant at least in 
the .01 range, using a 2-tail correlation coefficient.  Blank spaces indicate non-significant patterns.   
 
The second pattern involves class interests. The question asked about involvement 
in a “professional or business” group and could involve everything from shopkeepers to 
attorneys to import-export firms.8  Whatever it means,  it empowers and charges other 
relationships.  Those active in such  associations are active at high levels in almost every 
other activity, including some less likely ones  such as PTA and art or sports clubs.  
The third pattern involves association that are neither political nor economic. 
These are the community or cultural organizations. Look, for example, at involvement in 
a club.  It correlates with attending meetings (most likely club meetings) but not with 
much else.  It is only modestly limited to a few other activities of any kind.  Compare that 
with being involved in an art or other cultural group. That is linked to voting, but not to 
much else of a political nature.  Those involved in such groups have contacted officials 
through petitions or in other ways, but the strength of those relationships fade when 
compared with other activities of such persons.  Their involvement in village and ethnic 
groups is exceptionally high, as is their involvement in business or professional groups.  
For contrast, look at involvement in a school association (the PTA or PTO).  
These are traditionally considered women’s activity, specifically  the domain of stay-at-
home mother.  But Burns found that the reality was quite different.  Working mothers  
were more active in such organizations than their non-working counterparts.  Here we see 
that while PTA involvement is linked to political activities, it is much more strongly  
linked to almost every other cultural and community activity that we measured. The 
school is a community-wide organization so that involvement in school activities appears 
to push individuals into a wide range of community and social activities.   
Finally, there is a pattern not easily seen in bolded correlation coefficients.  It has 
to do with the fact that  these patterns run both ways.  Strong correlations show that 
people more active in one organization tend to be more active in another.  Less 
obviously, they also show that people not active in one organization tend  to be not active 
                                                 
8 We also asked a question about union membership.  Percentages involved were very low so it was 
dropped from the analysis, but it seemed to parallel some of these findings.   
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in another.  It would be a mistake to romanticize the ethnic community in the sense of a 
1950s movie in which everyone comes together in a town hall meeting to make a 
decision. Anyone who has been to an Arab or Chaldean  community event knows the 
amazing level of enthusiasm and linkage found there.  What is not obvious is the number 
of individuals who are absent from these organizations or activities. There is definitely an  
underclass in this community (if that is the right phrase), a bloc of people who are not 
involved or engaged in any meaningful way. That shows up in the percentages of  Table 
1 more than in these correlations.  It is not surprising that such an underclass exists for it 
exists in all communities but its existence must be noted.  
 
National versus Local Participation 
 
Earlier we saw that in the general population, voting tends to follow class lines 
and is distinct in this way from involvement in local activities.  Table 3 illustrates how 
this works in the Arab American community by presenting information on two activities, 
voting and PTA involvement.  Voting follows the national pattern of being  rooted in  
economic and social position.   While high levels of trust are shared by both voters and 
PTA activists, from here they diverge.  Income, education and business ownership all 
correlate highly with voter turnout but much less with PTA involvement.  Voting is also 
correlated with media involvement and higher levels of political information, a pattern 
definitely not true with PTA involvement.  There is a slight male advantage in voting, a 
significant female advantage in PTA engagement.  In those areas where the patterns run 
in the same direction, three (information, owns business, trust people) show much 
 
Table 3.  Voting and Participating in Parent Teacher Organization (DAAS).  
 Voted  Active in PTA  
Income  .331** -.149** Rank in Society 
Education     Rank in Society 
Owns Business .184** .077* Rank in Society 
Married  .065* .133** Rank in Society 
Gender (male)  .040 -.090*** Gender  
Live in Enclave .100 .132** Ethnic residence 
Read Newspaper .327** -.122** Information 
Knows Ashcroft .299** .144** Information 
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Knows Major party .299** .077* Information 
Trust People  .178** .136** Trust 
 
 
stronger relationships in the voting area.  Two (married and live in Dearborn area 
“enclave,” where perhaps 2/3 of all Muslims, and few Christians, live) sustain PTA 
activities.9  Clearly, these illustrate the national pattern in that they call upon different 
resources and different types of people.  It is interesting that among  voters, both 
information items correlate at an equal level but not among PTA activists.  They know 
the name Ashcroft but not which party is dominant in Congress.  Since both of these were 
Washington-based questions, it is possible that the name Ashcroft had an almost local 
dimension in that his policies reached down into the neighborhoods.  Party dominance in 
Washington is distant from local concerns, at least in terms of those active in the PTA.  
 
 
III. What is the link between  Religion and Participation? 
 
In America, a congregation almost always has what Stark and Finke (2000:193-
217) call a “niche.”  It may have an ethnic profile, a class profile, an ideological profile.   
Those congregations with  a stronger sense of separation or distinction from the broader 
society tend to generate a stronger sense of membership identity with the congregation. 
There are also high levels of political engagement  when congregations “serve as the 
primary organizational vehicles for social conflict” (p. 202).    
The Black churches might offer a helpful model for looking at the impact of Arab 
American religious organization on participation.  While the two communities are quite 
different in many ways,  both have a strong sense of identity and a non-mainstream 
position in society. Harris (1999) notes in his study of Black congregations  that  “The 
influence of religious culture on political mobilization is perhaps the least explored aspect 
of the interrelation of religion and political behavior”  (35). He believes that not only 
does religion provide members with the skills and confidence to participate in the 
political system (a common hypothesis) but also provides them with a sense of civic 
                                                 
9 Half of the students in the Dearborn schools are Arabs, mostly Lebanese or Yemeni.  Several schools are 
overwhelmingly so.  A local PTA could well be an ethnic association of women who know each other and 
may well have even village ties in their homeland. “Community” has a different meaning in this context.  
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culture (a sense of being citizens of a broader system) and a determination to produce 
social change. As he puts it, churches “serve as a source of civic culture by giving 
African Americans the opportunities to practice organizing and civic skills and to develop 
positive orientations toward the civic order” (p. 40).  Church attendance and affiliation 
tend to promote voting, to nurture civic obligation and legitimize the social order.  
Church attendance and membership encouraged  “campaign activism…fostered civic 
duty and provided organizational resources for such activism” (p. 66).  
Harris also notes how religious organizations can generate an “oppositional 
disposition” that enables individuals “to challenge their marginality through modes of 
action and thought that call for inclusion in the political system instead of exclusion from 
the polity.”  This “oppositional civic culture” ironically has a “dualistic orientation” to 
the structures of power.  The two thrusts “simultaneously support civil society and 
oppose a system of domination with that society.  Dominated groups may oppose their 
domination through conventional and unconventional modes of activism that attempt to 
reform society rather than undermine or overthrow it…By rejecting violence as a political 
strategy and supporting protest-demand activism, this oppositional civic culture among 
black Americans promoted inclusion within the polity rather than separation from 
existing political structure.”  In other words, African American religion “fostered both 
loyalty to the regime and opposition to aspects of that regime”  (p. 40, 67).   
Putnam (2000) addresses these issues from a different perspective, that of   social 
capital and its relationship to civic engagement.  Social capital (following DeTocqueville) 
involves self-confidence,  trust in society, commitment and  engagement.   It  has two 
dimensions, bridging and bonding. Bonding processes  pull homogeneous groups 
together, a process particularly relevant to an ethnic community.   “Dense networks in 
ethnic enclaves” provide “crucial social and psychological support for less fortunate 
members of the community, while furnishing start-up financing, markets, and reliable 
labor for local entrepreneurs”  (Putnam, 22-23).   Bridging networks, in contrast, pull 
diverse groups together for common purposes. The best outcome for society is that a 
bonding organization will promote the integration of the group into the larger society 
rather than its separation.  The danger is that the process, “by creating strong in-group 
loyalty, may also create strong out-group antagonism” and  accelerate tensions within 
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society.  Individuals can be highly bonded but never interact with more than a very 
limited segment of the population so that  the impact is less integrative than separatist. 
The “dark side of social capital,” as Putnam calls it, is that social capital can be 
organizationally and ideologically structured in a way that is ‘exclusionary along racial 
and gender and class lines” (p. 358).  
Putnam believes that  “faith communities in which people worship together are 
arguably the single most  important repository of social capital in America….Religiously 
active men and women learn to give speeches, run meetings, manage disagreements, and 
bear administrative responsibility…In part for these reasons, churchgoers are 
substantially more likely to be involved in secular organizations, to vote and participate 
politically in other ways, and to have deeper informal social connections” (p. 66).   
A third piece of research is relevant to this analysis.  Bellah (1992) wrote of what 
he called the American Civil Religion.  While this concept is less in vogue today (and 
vigorously resisted by some), it makes an important point.  According to Bellah, 
Americans have historically had a perspective of what they believed, who they were and 
what they hoped to achieve with their country.  According to this belief system,  America 
is a unique country aspiring to fair play and full equality for all citizens.  It is a nation 
drawn from different nations, bringing people together into a common identity.  That 
identity allows for exceptional diversity within its population, freeing groups to observe 
their separate religious or cultural practices so long as they affirm the nationa l “myth.”  
Americans believe that religion is good and should receive respect but that its practice 
should be private and its religious authorities not involved in the governance process.  
Americans are proud of their country in a way that often seems corny or even 
chauvinistic to other peoples.  In this belief, immigrants can become full Americans  so 
long as they affirm these things.  As Abraham Lincoln said in  the Lincoln-Douglas 
debate of July 10, 1858, those who adhere to the principles of the Republic are “blood of 
the blood,” as American as if they were directly descended from those who signed the 
Declaration of Independence.   
These models leave us with some questions:  In the Arab-American community, 
does strong religious involvement increase engagement with the broader community or 
does it generate a sense of separatism and isolation?   Within the community do 
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patriotism and protest go together, or do they diverge?  Finally, are those who identify 
with the American myth more like to participate in the political process?   
Some of these patterns emerge, others do not (see Table 4).  The most powerful 
pattern is that those active in religious organizations are significantly more likely to be 
involved in a host of other organizations and activities.  This is a pattern that also 
emerges in the general population, but in the Arab-American community it is consistently 
more dramatic.  Moreover, it does not apply just in ethnic organizations such as culture 
clubs, town and country clubs, and advocacy groups such as ADC, but extends into the 
common organizations of society.  People are noticeably more likely to be involved in the 
PTA or a union if they are active in a congregation.  The pattern also extends into the 
political realm.  Active members are more likely to vote or be registered. They are also 
more likely to have participated in a low frequency activity, such as contacting an 
official, contributing to a political cause or signing a petition.   
There is also evidence of both the civil religion and an “oppositional” culture 
among the religious, although with lesser strength of pattern.  Those who are religiously 
active are more likely to be proud to be an American, feel this is a land of opportunity, 
and feel at home in America.   While they are more likely to trust people in general, they 
are also more likely to feel that  Arab Americans are not respected by the general 
population.  Regarding the media and its perceived hostility against Muslims and Islam,  
a pattern is only marginally present.  This is not surprising since perception of a hostile 
media is widespread in the community (and in the general populace as well).  One does 
not have to attend religious services or have a religious way of thinking to feel this way.   
Regarding the “oppositional” culture and its love-hate relationship with power, 
the pattern is there (which is noteworthy) but is not as strong as one might anticipate. 
Active members are less likely to trust the legal system, marginally less likely to think a 
person accused of terrorism could receive a fair trial, and slightly less likely to trust the 
police, parties and the government in Washington.  Moreover, they are less likely to 
compromise on civil liberties issues as a means of enhancing security in the post- 
September 11 age. 
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Table 4.  Religiously Active, General Population  and DAAS.              
                   Active in congregation       Nature of Item 
 General           DAAS  
Population          
DAAS 
Voted 2000 .218**             .212** Action  
Registered to vote .148**             .233** Action 
Attend public meetings .093                 .030 Action 
Signed petition                         .271** Action 
Contributed to Pol.    .103*            .169**   Action 
Contacted official  -.029               .168** Action 
Attend club meet.  -.133*              .026 Organization 
Village or town club   --                   .352** Organization 
Ethnic or Advocacy    --                  .340** Organization 
Attend sports club .188**             .339** Organization 
Attend culture club .184**             .356** Organization 
PTA/PTO  .214**            .344** Organization 
Professional or Bus.    .129**            .357** Organization 
Union Member                          .205** Organization 
Proud to be America                         .088 Civil religion 
Equal opportunity                         .090 Civil religion 
Home in America --                     .90** Civil religion 
Media bias: Islam                        -.035 Hostile Environ 
Arabs not respected                         .120 Hostile Environ 
Trust legal system                        -.189 Trust 
Fair Trial                         -.044 Trust  
Surveil, detain, Stop                        -.121 Security focus 
Confidence ADC    --                    -.003 Trust 
Trust people                           .096 Trust 
Trust police                         -.042 Trust 
Trust parties                          -.053 Trust 
Trust DC govern.                         -.070 Trust 
 Pearson’s R  two-tailed,  *significant at .05     **Significant at .01  
 
What do these findings  say  about the role of religion in creating and enhancing a 
political culture of engaged resistance?   There is no doubt that the religious structures are 
in some way encouraging or pushing individuals into the political and public arena.10  
Active individuals are more likely to be institutionally involved and  more likely to be 
                                                 
10 While writing this paper, the author asked several people who attend a variety of mosques and churches 
if their religious leaders mentioned politics or encouraged people to vote. There was a mixed response on 
whether political issues were discussed from the pulpit but all said they were encouraged to vote either by 
the imam or priest, or by organized groups within the congregation.  
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participants in the political arena. They are more likely to feel a part of the country and to 
affirm its civil religion,  but are also more likely to feel that there are institutional and 
cultural impediments to their full involvement in the system. Interestingly, while they are 
more likely to be active in the ADC, the major civil rights advocacy organization in the 
community, confidence in this organization appears to cut across the community without 
regard to whether one is active in religious organizations or not.  
 
IV.  What is the Link Between Gender and Participation 
 
One of the most comprehensive and insightful studies of gender and participation 
is  Burns et al (2001).  Their findings constitute a model  seen nationally against which 
we can compare the Arab American and Chaldean experience.  They note  that while the 
participation gap by gender is less in the US than in other democracies, it still remains 
true that men participate at higher levels than women (p. 20).  On an eight point scale, 
women participate at 1.96, men at 2.27 (p. 1).  The authors note that this is not a simple 
categorical difference but that “gender differences are contextual, their extent and nature 
varying across social domains.”  Class, race and ethnicity all play a role producing a 
“heterogeneity among men and among women.”  We should conceptualize any 
differences less as a dichotomy (male and female)  than as “overlapping bell curves with 
different means” (p. 28).  In other words, “Sometimes the differences among men and 
among women are greater than the differences between men and women” (p. 28).    
Regarding why such differences occur, the authors offer several “hunches” that 
serve as working hypotheses (pp. 7-8).  While some deal with data not included in this 
study, five can  provide background for our analysis.  First is the “free time” thesis, that 
women have less free time for participation than men.  As they put it, “those with 
children at home and full-time jobs, simply do not have the time to take part in politics.”  
This is tied into a psychic space thesis that “Raising children so absorbs available mental 
energy that mothers, especially those with toddlers under foot, are too preoccupied at 
home to pay attention to politics” (P. 7).  
Third is a family structure argument, that the patriarchal family does not train 
females for participation.  When “men function as the undisputed head of household and 
women are unequal at home, women can never function equally as citizens.”  This is 
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connected to the socialization argument, that childhood and adult socialization “create 
different environments for men and women and lead them to draw different conclusions 
about the relevance of politics to their lives.”  Women may live in a world with less 
exposure to informal political chat and other politicizing cues.  
Fifth is a socioeconomic resources argument, that since education, income, and  
occupational status drive participation, to the extent that women are disadvantaged in 
those areas, they will be less likely to participate.  
When they examined the data, the scholars found  that some hypotheses were 
“just plain wrong” and that no single reason explains the gap in political activity.  Instead 
there are several factors.   
First, men enjoy an advantage when it comes to the single most important 
resource for political participation, formal education.  In addition, the non-
political institutions of adult life—in particular, the work place—function as an 
important source of the factors that foster participation.  Because women are less 
likely than men to be in the work force, and because, even if employed full time, 
they are less likely to hold the kinds of jobs that provide these factors, gender 
differences in work force experiences loom large in our explanation of the 
disparity in political activity.  Finally, women are less likely than men to be 
psychologically engaged with politics—that is, to be politically interested, 
informed, or efficacious—a deficit that contributes significantly to participatory 
inequalities.  However, when women are in an environment where women seek 
and hold visible public offices, they are more politically interested and informed, 
and disparities in psychological orientations to politics shrink (pp. 8-9).   
 
Americans are often told that Arab women are held back from their natural 
potential by Arab or Islamic culture.  During the time of this research, President Bush 
frequently asserted that the American army in Iraq and Afghanistan was working to 
advance women’s rights.  While few serious scholars accept that reasoning, the issue 
must be addressed:  If Arab men  have the opportunity to achieve whatever is within their 
potential and merit, then perhaps male-female differences in attitudes or participation 
could be explained by cultural or religious values.  This is a hypothesis to consider.  
 
A Pattern of Minimal Differences 
When we look at the evidence, we find that men and women are remarkably 
similar (return to Table 1).  They are similarly   likely to be citizens, to be fluent in 
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English, to watch television news, to read an Arabic newspaper, to perceive a media that 
is hostile to Muslims and Arabs, and to follow the war on terror.  They are equally likely 
to feel at home in America, to identify with the country, and to feel that it is a land of 
equal opportunity.  They have similar partisan identifications and similar ideological 
distribution (both genders more on the conservative or middle of the political spectrum).   
An unpublished analysis of gender experiences and perspectives in the aftermath 
of September 11 also found a remarkable absence of  differences in this significant area.11  
Men and women were within a few percentages of each other in terms of whether they 
had a bad experience after September 11 (16% to 15%), had a supportive experience after 
September 11 (34% to 32%), whether anyone in their family had experienced one of five 
specific overt harmful acts (an average of 1% difference over the five),  whether they 
were guarded or nervous during the interview (no difference, 14% each).   A few 
differences did emerge.  Regarding the “security mom” hypothesis (that women are more 
security conscious than men),  women were 7% more likely to say that September 11 had 
shaken their sense of security and were 11% more likely to say the Iraq War had shaken 
their sense of security.  But the pattern was not across the board.  On four questions about 
willingness to compromise civil liberties to enhance security, men were slightly (3%) 
more likely to approve.  Regarding three other civil liberties compromises (these targeted 
at Arab Americans), there was just a little over a point difference on average.   
On cultural issues, there was a difference but even here it was mixed.  Women 
were more conservative on some issues, but not much different on others.  They were 
19% more likely to say that premarital sex was never justified (59% to 78%) and 
somewhat more likely to support  modest dress (a 7% difference in wearing hejab among 
Muslims for example).  But on issues such as abortion, gambling, or divorce the two 
genders were very similar.  (Muslims and Christians were likewise remarkably similar).  
Both genders were  trusting of people (men 88%, women 85%) and less but similarly 
trusting of   people in their neighborhood (men 31%, women 37%).  Men and women 
both showed high levels of confidence in certain local institutions (the schools, men 69%, 
women 77%, the police, men 84%, women  87%, the legal system, men 68%, women 
                                                 
11Ronald R. Stockton,  “Arab Americans in an Age of War,  Findings From the Detroit Arab American 
Study with an Emphasis upon Gender Patterns,”  American Political Science Association, September, 2004.  
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65%.  The pattern persisted when asked about trust in political parties (men 25%, women 
22%) and the government in Washington (men 55%, women  51%).  If one is looking for 
dramatic differences between men and women, it is more often absent than present.  
But at some points they diverge, often in ways significant for political 
involvement.  The demographic facts show that women have deficits in those areas most 
likely to produce higher levels of participation.  They are less likely to work outside of 
the home (70% of men do, 40% of women), to have a college degree (28% of men, 19% 
of women), or to be involved in a business or professional association.  They are also in 
deficit in terms of media consumption. Women are significantly less likely to read a daily 
newspaper or to get news from the internet.  Perhaps the most significant difference, 
however, is that women suffer a major information deficit.   Women were 27% less likely 
to know the name of the US Attorney General (Ashcroft at the time, a name used almost 
casually among activists and leaders).  They were 16% less likely to be able to identify 
the Republicans as the majority party in Congress (at the time controlling both the Senate 
and the House of Representatives).  To be honest, these findings are not surprising.  
Burns et al noted that men were 14% more likely to know the name of at least one 
Senator from their state (p. 343).   While we should not over generalize, the expectation 
that men are more likely than women to have a public life appears to be true, not only 
among Arab Americans but in the general public as well.  
 
What Drives Gender Participation Patterns? 
 
Table 5  shows the impact of various elements upon whether or not one votes.  
When this table is compared with the significant differences of participation rates by 
gender shown in Table 1, the results are remarkable.  There is very little gender effect in 
this table.  Males and females show remarkably similar patterns, patterns that track 
Table 5.  Percentage Voting by Traits.   
 Females Males 
Education 
   Less than HS 
   High School 
   High School + 
   Bachelor degree 
 
21 
43 
44 
64 
 
28 
25 
53 
61 
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   Bachelor degree+ 76 69 
Income under $20k 
    20-49,000 
    50-99,000 
    100,000 + 
22 
35 
56 
53 
16 
35 
48 
73 
Read newspaper never 
    2 
    3 
    Daily 
27 
52 
51 
80 
26 
48 
57 
68 
Major party correct 
   Not correct  
59 
49 
57 
46 
Identify Ashcroft 
   Failed to Identify him 
69 
56 
62 
67 
Now working 
   Not working  
43 
34 
50 
42 
Speaks English V Well 
   Well 
    Not well 
    Not at all 
55 
30 
 1 
 4 
50 
30 
11 
 0 
 
 
national trends very closely.  As we noted earlier, there is a national tendency for men to 
be more involved in the political system than women.  We also noted that this is a 
function of having those “resources” associated with participation.  As Burns et al 
observe, it is not that men and women are  inherently different but that their bell curves 
have different means.  This table shows as clearly as it could that being possessed of 
those resources that drive political engagement—education, income, information—
affects women and men in similar ways.  For both genders, voting is enhanced by more 
education, more income, more information.  The correlation statistics that go with Table 
5 show that the strength of those relationships are very similar. 
    
    Male  Female 
Education   .318  .324 
Income   .410  .259 
Read newspapers  .331  .329 
Identify major party  .222  .240 
Identify Ashcroft    .269 
Working   .082  .064 
English fluency  .264  .362 
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These are very parallel patterns.  All are highly significant (.000), except for the 
impact of working upon turnout, which is weak and non-significant for both men and 
women.  Male voting appears to be somewhat more influenced by income level, female 
voting somewhat more by English fluency, but otherwise these are similar stories. 
Anyone looking for an “Arab effect” in this population will not find it.  Arabs Americans 
are different from the general population in their statistical means, just as men are 
different from women in their statistical means.  But by and large, what drives anyone  
away from those means, into higher participation rates or into lower participation rates, is 
very similar for all population groups analyzed in this paper.  
 
Conclusions:  A Middle Ground of Engagement 
 
In spite of several excellent studies of Arab American politics,  this is in some 
ways a relatively new field of research.  Few of those who published before the new 
century began were professionally trained in the area of their endeavor.  (That certainly 
includes my own modest ventures into the field).  Right now Arab American studies is 
struggling to find a paradigm and a body of scientific theory  to serve as a foundation for 
its efforts.  Empirical studies of the community are few, as are works that build upon 
existing theory.  Equally scarce are  efforts to put the Arab American experience into 
some historical context by making meaningful comparisons with other immigrant or 
ethnic experiences in the past.   Some studies  present a racialization model, suggesting 
that all “people of color” share a common set of experiences and positions in society,  but 
this model has its limitations.  Anyone trying to put contemporary Haitians and Cubans 
into one box will see how overly broad the  concept is.  Moreover, the racialization model 
often focuses more upon the thinking and behavior of the  white majority (sometimes 
seen as a power structure with little  internal differentiation) than upon Arab Americans 
themselves.  Those interested in how diverse ethnic groups create a common 
consciousness or set of institutional structures would do well to consider  some of the 
really fine research from the past, for example Rudolph and Rudolph (1967) on caste 
transformation in India or Melson and Wolpe (1970) on emergent tribalism in Nigeria. 
Such studies are distant enough to be ‘safe’ but relevant enough to be conceptually 
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useful.  The scientific process involves extracting from a specific case or set of data,  
patterns and models that can be generalized into theory and then tested against other 
cases in different places and in different times with confirmation or refinement following.  
A study from lands or times far away can  free us from contemporary distractions.    
Fortunately, the universities are turning out a new generation of scholars.  What is 
needed at this point are two  things.   First, there is need for more empirical analysis, 
using  scientific samples of Arab-American public opinion.  As valuable as such samples 
are, gathering them is difficult and expensive.  I would invite anyone interested in a short 
cut to use the Detroit Arab American Study data set, which is in the public domain and 
available to anyone who wants it.12  Second, we  need more scientific community studies 
of how local populations have functioned and acted in the political system.  These 
studies, whatever form they take, have to be more than just reports or they will not enter 
the corpus of scientifically useful literature.  Not only do they need to be grounded in 
existing scientific research with solid theory behind them but they also need to be 
comparative. But with whom to compare? Is the relevant comparison group 
contemporary Puerto Ricans and Hindus, or Poles in Chicago a century ago and Jews in 
New York at that same time?  I think we need to be more creative in seeking out useful 
historic analogies.  
Arab-Americans often say “we exist on both sides of the hyphen” but those who 
study Arab-Americans are often so attentive to the waves of non-western immigrants 
coming into the country that they overlook the rich literature that analyzes historical 
development in this land.13  While there is no doubt  that those from the Arab world are 
uniquely different in some ways, the American experience with receiving new waves of 
vastly different immigrants also has its own uniqueness. Consider the following overview 
of what Wiebe (2002: 28-29) found of  the Germans who arrived in this land the mid-
1800s (before Germany was a unified state):   
                                                 
12 Contact the Institute of Social Research, University of Michigan.  
13 The reader not familiar with this Americanist literature might want to start with three excellent 
historical studies.   Jacobson (2002) writes of the Polish, Jewish and Irish communities a century 
ago; Fischer (1989) writes of the four different religio-ethnic groups who entered this land from 
England, groups today treated as if they are the same; and Wiebe (2002) writes of how 19th 
century ethnic groups (Germans, Swedes, Norwegians, and others) navigated the multi-ethnic, 
multi-religious environment of American society.   
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They had two religions so different from each other as to prohibit interaction.  
They were drawn from different parts of Germany so as to share no common territorial 
identity.  They were largely left out of the German unification process, which was 
territorially oriented and not considerate of overseas German populations.  Their identity 
as Germans was with a language and a culture, not with a state and its interests.  
Separated from Germany, they “concentrated on life in America” and created new 
identities and organizations.  “Proudly German in culture, they constructed inturning little 
societies around church, language, customs, and celebrations.  There they prospered in 
groups:  German families embedded in Germany communities situated once and for all in 
America.  The more binding the cultural cement, the more self-sufficient their social 
environment became; the more self-sufficient their environment, the more distant they 
grew from Germany” (p. 29).  
Does this not sound like a description of many Arab immigrant communities in 
this country?  And if so, would Germans not be an interesting model to compare with 
Arab Americans? Arabs are right now experiencing a ferocious whiplash from the 
spillover of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict into this country, and a backlash from 
September 11 (See for example Howell and Shryock, 2002 or Caincair, 2004 or Salita, 
2005).   No one can deny that.  But at the same time, they are in a country with its own 
historic experiences.  Without denying that which is unique, there surely must be other 
patterns that are shared.  It is important to consider both sides of that coin.   
For the sake of illustration  let me present a case of political  interaction from a 
time and place so far away that it may seem bizarre, and yet perhaps it can help us in 
some way to think through our contemporary dynamic. For a hundred and sixty-five 
years, starting in 1650, in the area of the Great Lakes,  Frenchmen, few in numbers, 
mostly but not entirely merchants,  lived among the powerful Algonquin peoples of that 
region. The Algonquin system had the appearance of central authority and yet in reality 
was highly decentralized so that much flexibility existed at the local level.  The two  
cultures and languages and societies  could not have been more different.  As White 
(1991) puts it in his excellent study, they “regarded each other as alien, as other, as 
virtually nonhuman…but their mixture created new systems of meaning and of 
exchange” (ix-x). The two sides were pulled together by the reality of mutual expediency.  
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The Algonquin needed what the French traders brought, the French needed what the 
powerful, numerous Algonquin could offer by means of security and assistance.  In this 
“middle ground” as White calls it, far away from the power centers of their two 
civilizations, local people worked out mutually beneficial arrangements.  
For the exchange to work, they needed a set of common terms and values around 
which they could conduct discourse and negotiation.  Since no such corpus existed, they 
set off on a journey of  what White identifies as creative misunderstandings (p. x).  Each 
side tried “to persuade others who are different from themselves by appealing to what 
they perceive to be the values and practices of those others.”  Each side would 
“misinterpret and distort“ both their own values and practices and those of the other side, 
but these distortions were done with a purpose so that “from these misunderstandings 
arise new meanings,  through them new practices—the shared meaning and practices of 
the middle ground” (p. x).  This process of interaction “involved a process of mutual 
invention by both the French and the Algonquians” (p. 50).  The compromises and 
adaptations occurred because neither side was able to get what it wanted through 
coercion or force. Both sides were willing “to justify their own actions in terms of what 
they perceived to be their partner’s cultural premises.”  Each side acted for their own 
interests “but they had to convince people of another culture that some mutual action was 
fair and legitimate” (p. 52).  Put differently, “To further its interests, each side had to 
attain cultural legitimacy in terms of the other” (p. 55).  
At the local level, an interesting process of negotiation occurred in which “Both 
sides now had to justify their own rules in terms of what they perceived to be the 
practices of the other” (p. 81).  What White calls “the ritual of the middle ground” created 
a rhetoric of discourse and a set of understandings that  drew elements from both cultures 
“but fully corresponded to neither” (p. 93).  Interestingly, each side used the values of the 
other side to explain and justify its own rationales and interests.  
Resistance to  accommodations in  the middle ground came from those who were 
distant from reality or who felt threatened in some way by what was going on. Back in 
France, Chateaubriand and Rousseau created “imaginary Indians” who “bore no 
resemblance to the real Algonquins” (p. 51).  Likewise, the Algonquin elite saw local 
villages working out arrangements with the French that were beyond their control.  The 
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enemies of accommodation--the militant Indian haters and the Algonquin raiders (both of 
whom  used exceptional violence) targeted those who tried to work out accommodation 
(p. 388).  In the end, the militants won, and the political middle ground was destroyed. 
Let’s leave the eighteenth century and return to our own “middle ground.”  Let 
the reader think  back to the excerpt from Howell and Jamal explaining how deeply 
integrated Arab Americans are in the fabric of Detroit’s  public realm.  Let the reader also 
remember the USAPATRIOT Act, FBI and NSA surveillance, Treasury department 
monitoring of Islamic charities, and the inflammatory rhetoric from  the electronic media.  
There must be a way to reconcile these  contradictory phenomena.  
There are few places in the country where the Michigan  pattern would be 
repeated.  In Michigan, an Arab American appointed to a civil rights board is not 
removed after protests;  an Arab American who sends a donation to a candidate does not 
have the money returned;  and an Arab American slated for public office is not vetoed  by  
state party leaders.  All of these things happened during the period of this research, but 
not in Michigan. 14  When Arab and non-Arab leaders meet in Michigan, there is a dance 
of mutuality that goes on.  The non-Arab leader will declare that the Arabs are fine 
citizens and good businessmen (even though most are not) who have brought hard work, 
family values, and a rich culture into the American mainstream.  The Arabs will declare 
their absolute loyalty to America, praise it as a land of opportunity, and declare that with 
more trade between America and the Arab world there would be a significant reduction 
of terrorism.  It is what one scholar has called a type of reverse Orientalism. 15   The Arabs  
                                                 
14 In 200x, the local FBI announced that they were going to give an award to Imad Hamed, the head of the 
local ADC chapter.  Hamed had done yeoman work after September 11 in persuading the FBI to be 
sensitive to the concerns and fears of the local community and had persuaded the local community that 
there were legitimate security concerns to which they should cooperate with the authorities whenever 
possible.  Hamed was an interesting person, a Palestinian whose refugee family lived in a camp in 
Lebanon. He was one of the first test cases of the practice of using secret evidence in deportation hearings.  
A judge had ordered the government either to present their case or withdraw it.  They had withdrawn.  This 
author had attended Hamed’s citizenship ceremony, at which various government officials were present.  
Hamed had thanked everyone for attending and said that after a few refreshments with his guests he was 
going to go directly to city hall to register to vote.  Withdrawing the award was a shock for which no one 
had an explanation.  The local FBI officials were quick to say that it did not suggest any wrongdoing and 
Hamed was soon invited to Washington for a different ceremony honoring him.  Both sides needed the 
other and the middle ground held, in its own messy way.  
15 Orientalism is a process whereby western people “imagine” a Middle East that does not exist except in 
their mind.  It is a world of oversimplification and stereotypes.  Kalmar (2005) says a process of reversal  
can  occur  in which eastern people create their own fantasy orient as a way of  “improving the image of 
their people” and making their culture and role in western society more palatable and successful (p. 351).  
 30 
proclaim that they are different but are different in ways that represent or enhance true 
America values.  The non-Arabs proclaim that  you are the same as us, and are bringing 
in value added.  The Arab leaders get their business and appointments and contracts.  The 
non-Arabs get votes, endorsements, and the absence of resistance.  Both sides proclaim 
themselves devoted to American security and determined to stop discrimination or ethnic 
profiling. It is a dance  that works nicely for the benefit of both sides.  
At the same time, however, this accommodation is being buffeted by militant 
elements on both sides. On the domestic front, hawkish anti-Islamic intellectuals, media 
personalities, and politicians use phrases such as “Arab terrorism” or “Islamic 
extremism” as if they were single words. Pub lic opinion shows high levels of suspicion 
and hostility towards Arabs and Muslims (Keeter and Kohut, 2003, Washington Post, 
2006).  Incidents of violence and harassment are not as frequent  in the Detroit area as in 
some places, but they occur.  On the Arab and Muslim side, there is a constant barrage of 
anti-American statements coming from overseas militants.  This creates serious problems 
for Arabs and Muslims in the US as they are frequently confused with such people or are 
put in the uneasy position of explaining away or repudiating intemperate words or violent 
actions simply because they share a category with others.   There are also ethnic and 
religious chauvinists within the domestic communities, on the one side insisting that 
Arabs and Muslims are not truly Americans, on the other attacking those who 
accommodate  for being “too American.”  The middle ground is strong but is being 
buffeted.  As White noted,  “the middle ground blurred boundaries” and became a threat 
to those whose power and status were  based upon separation and distinction (p. 388).   In 
the case of the French and the Algonquin the extremists won, the  system broke down in a 
paroxysm of wars and violence, and the middle ground was destroyed.  There is no 
reason to believe that such a pattern would be repeated today, but the stresses and 
                                                                                                                                                 
He suggests that Benjamin Disraeli, Jewish in heritage but not religion,  created such an idealized Jew in 
his novel Tancred.  This Jew was  a “giver of Eastern wisdom” who worked with the “leaders of the 
ascendant West” for common benefit (p. 359).  As this research was going on, a local Arab American group 
sponsored a major conference linking Middle East and American business people. The head of the event 
argued  that American Arabs could be a moderating force in the Middle East and if business links were 
increased, this would reduce the chance of future terrorist attacks.    
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tensions are sufficiently similar to make one think.  And even if the analogy breaks down, 
finding the reasons why it did not work can advance the scientific process.  
 
Final Thoughts 
What appears to be happening in the Arab-American community is  complex but 
is generally consistent with what social science theory would predict.  First,  Arabs are 
pleased to be in this country and identify with it, in spite of doubts about some of its 
policies and the way their community is treated.  Second, there is strong identification 
with their own community organizations and structures, and confidence in those bodies.  
Third,  involvement in these organizations appears to be linked with involvement in other 
organizations, both communal and society-wide.  The congregation appears to play a 
particular role in driving this engagement process.  Fourth, in terms of gender 
participation, both men and women cross the spectrum from active to indifferent.  The 
forces that drive men and  women into the public or community arena are similar for both 
genders and are the same forces that affect their non-Arab neighbors. While the base 
levels of participation for Arabs is lower than for non-Arabs, the dynamic of who 
participates and who does not is quite similar.   
Put simply, there does not appear to be any unique “Arab” pattern that is beyond 
what we know about communal groups. Those differences that exist are not surprising,  
based on the  history, situation and makeup of the population.  They are Arabs and are in 
this land during a time of war, a war that often puts some from their homelands or from 
their religious category in a confrontational position against their current country.  In this 
regard they are not fundamentally different from World War I German immigrants or 
Korean War Chinese.   
If we were to reduce the findings of this paper to a headline it would be something 
like this:  Arab-Americans:  history different, situation different,  participation patterns 
boringly normal.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 32 
Bibliography 
 
Arab-American Institute. “Arab American Demographics.  Michigan.” Arab American 
Institute Foundation, 2003.  
  
Abraham, Nabeel.  “Anti-Arab Racism and Violence in the United States” in McCarus, 
155-214.  
 
Bagby, Ihsan, Paul M Perl, and Bryan T. Froehle.  The Mosque in America: A National 
Portrait.  A Report From  the Mosque Study Project.  Council on American-Islamic 
Relations, Washington, D. C., 2001.  
  
Bellah, Robert. The Broken Covenant.  American Civil Religion in Time of Trial.  
Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1992.  
 
Boosahda, Elizabeth.  Arab-American Faces and Voices.  The Origins of an Immigrant 
Community.  (Austin, University of Texas Press, 2003). 
 
Burns, Nancy, Kay Lehman Schlozman, and Sidney Verba.  The Private Roots of Public 
Action.  Gender, Equality, and Political Participation.  Cambridge, Mass: Harvard 
University Press, 2001.  
 
Cainkar, Louise.  “The Impact of the September 11 Attacks and Their Aftermath on Arab 
and Muslim Communities in the United States.”  GSC Quarterly 13 (Summer/Fall, 2004).  
 
DeTocqueville,  Alexis.  Democracy in America.  Edited by J. P. Mayer, Translated by 
George Lawrence.  HarperCollins publishers, 1969. 
 
Fischer, David Hackett, Albion’s Seed.  Four British Folkways in America.  (New York: 
Oxford University Press, 1989).  
 
Haddad, Yvonne Yazbeck, Jane I. Smith, Kathleen M. Moore.  Muslim Women in 
America. The Challenge of Islamic Identity Today.  (New York: Oxford University Press, 
2006).  
 
Harris, Frederick C.  Something Within. Religion in African-American Political Activism. 
(New York: Oxford University Press, 1999).  
 
Howell, Sally and Amaney Jamal.  “The Aftermath of the 9/11 Attacks among Arab 
Americans:  Detroit Exceptionalism and the Limits of Political Incorporation.” Paper  
presented to the Michigan Conference of Political Scientists,  2005.  
 
Howell, Sally and Andrew Shryock.  “Cracking Down on the Diaspora: Arab Detroit and 
America’s “War on Terror.”  Anthropology Quarterly, 2003, 443-462.  
 
 33 
Jacobson, Matthew Frye.  Special Sorrows.  The Diasporic Imagination of Irish, Polish, 
and Jewish Immigrants in the United States.  Berkeley: University of California Press, 
2002.  
 
Kalmar, Ivan Davidson.  “Benjamin Disraeli, Romantic Orientalist.”  Comparative 
Studies in Society and History.  2005, 348-371.  
 
Keeter, Scott and Andrew Kohut.  “American Public Opinion About Muslims in the U.S. 
and Abroad.”  In Strum, Philippa and  Danielle Tarantolo (eds.), Muslims in the United 
States, Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars, 2003, 185-202.  
 
McCarus, Ernest (ed.).  The Development of Arab-American Identity. (Ann Arbor: 
University of Michigan Press, 1994).  
 
Melson, Robert  and Howard Wolpe.  “Modernization and the Politics of Communalism: 
A Theoretical Perspective.”  American Political Science Review, LXIV, 4 (December, 
1970), 1112-1130.  
 
Miller, Melisssa K.   The Joiners:  Voluntary Organizations and Political Participation 
in the United States.   Ph. D. Dissertation.  Northwestern University, 2004.  
 
Putnam, Robert D.  Bowling Alone.  The Collapse and Revival of American Community.  
(New York: Touchstone Book, 2000). 
 
Rudolph,  Lloyd and  Susanne Hoeber Rudolph.  The Modernity of Tradition.  Political 
Development in India.  Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1967.  
 
Salaita, Steve. Ethnic Identity and Imperative Patriotism:  Arab Americans Before and 
After 9/11.”  College Literature 32 (2005): 146-168.  
 
Samhan, Helen.  “By the Numbers.”  Arab American Business. October, 2003. 27+.  
 
Smith, Tom W.  “The Muslim Population of the United States: The Methodology of 
Estimates,”  Public Opinion Quarterly, Fall, 2002, 404-417.  
 
Stark, Rodney and Roger Finke. Acts of Faith.  Explaining the Human Side of Religion.  
(Berkeley: University of California Press, 2000).  
 
Suleiman, Michael W. (ed.). Arabs in America.  Building a New Future.  (Philadelphia: 
Temple University Press, 1999).  
 
Suleiman, Michael W. “Arab-Americans in the Political Process.” In McCarus (1994), 
37-60.   
 
Suleiman, Michael W. The Arab American Experience,” in Suleiman (1999), 1-21.  
 34 
Terry, Janis J.  “Community and Political Activism Among Arab Americans in Detroit,”  
in Suleiman (1999), 241-254.   
 
US. Census Bureau.  The Arab Population, 2000.  December, 2003.  
 
Washington Post poll 
 
White, Richard.  The Middle Ground.  Indians, Empires, and Republics in the Great 
Lakes Region, 1650-1815.  Cambridge University Press, 1991.  
 
Wiebe,  Robert H.  Who We Are.  A History of Popular Nationalism.  Princeton: 
Princeton University Press, 2002.  
 
Yearbook of American and Canadian Churches,  Eileen W. Lindner (ed.), 2000.   
 
Zogby, James.  Arab American Institute Website Arab-AAI.org.   
 
Zogby, James. J.  “The Arab American Vote in the November, 2000 Election.”  Arab 
American Institute, December, 2000.  
 
 
Appendix: Questions Used 
  
